-->Hi Debra,

>Will this never end?

OK, im getting a little tired of this discussion too... :->

>I really dont understand how Henri can so firmly believe that  identity can
>be considered a mechanical series of brainevents or brain chemistry....that
>can be remixed.

I try not to believe anything! I assume that the body is subject 
to the same physical laws as any other object. The body is 
constructed of atoms, and so is the brain. The atoms interact 
according to the laws of physics. Thus their behavior can be 
described by mechanics, be it an empirical simplification 
(like molecular mechanics, which is likely to be more than 
sufficient for describing any higher level of non chemical 
processes) or if required, quantum mechanics (almost perfect 
if there are no relativistic effects).

Basically, the brain/body is a system of particles which can 
be described by mechanics. The mind is a process in the brain, 
and thus in principle can also be described by mechanics.

However I prefer to describe the brain at a higher level as 
a neural network. A network of neural cells, a very complex 
network of very simple computing cells. Scientific research
seems to indicate that this higher level description is 
very likely sufficient enough to describe all the aspects of 
the human mind. 

>Maybe I'm missing something quite
>essential but I do not understand how you see identity as something
>potentially 'mechanical' and IN THIS WAY reproduceable. 

Identity is stored the brain, i.e. in a system of particles 
that behaves in a mechanical way. 

Note, according to me, identity is a state, it is not a process!  

>MOST IMPORTANTLY-----> We are not the SOLE producers of our life
>experience. We INTERACT with OTHERS in LOCATIONS under specific
>environmental CONDITIONS.

Yes, our interaction with other individuals, and the environment 
we experience, shapes our identity. 

But this does not contracdict that identity is stored in a 
mechanical system.

_____________________________________________________________________________


Alex Morgan wrote:

>Your argument is perfectly sound in that a human brain can be explained in
>terms of mechanics, both at a cellular level and an atomic layer. 

OK

>However, Imagine that you have two hydrogen molecules, that are exactly 
>the same. Does that make them 'the same?' 

No, not the same, but two hydrogen molecules are interchangeable.

(But do not connect this with the identity issue.)

>Both copies of yourself will have exactly
>the same consciousness, just in two different places at the same time. 
>Why is that so hard to understand? 

It's not hard to understand : I agree!  :->

Hmm, but did you understand me ?

Please take a closer look at my 2 hypothetical scenarios (CASE1 and CASE2).

_____________________________________________________________________________


KC Homes wrote :

>Either way, the concept of "same" or close to "same" will involve cloning of
>humans and most likely creating of multiple copies of one individual to
>understand completely the processes governing brain development, social
>interactions, self image and perception of others. 

NO, in principle (and in the future in practice) copies of individuals 
can be made without *ANY understanding* of how the human mind works! 

And clones are bad examples. They are certainly not copies with 
identical identities. As a matter of fact, genetical twins actually 
are clones. And as everybody knows, generally they do not seem to claim 
to have identical identities.

_____________________________________________________________________________

David Pizer wrote :

>I have devised a quick test to see if you do or do not think that a
>duplicate is you.  
<snip>
>3.	The instructor says that you have to shoot either the duplicate or
>yourself, or else he will have to shoot both of you.  You are not allowed
>to shoot the instructor.
<snip>
>Only if you are willing to shoot yourself do you show that you believe the
>duplicate is you.

Ehh... there is of course a major problem : EMOTIONS. As long as we are 
beings that do not have total control over our emotions this sitation 
will be a big problem for these two individuals.

But if the two individuals would have total control over their 
emotions, then we would do the following :

(( For simplicity lets consider that the copying action was done only 
half one hour ago. This will substantially decrease the importance 
of deciding which copy's last experiences will be the most valuable. In 
fact I wouldnt make big deal of loosing a half an hour of information 
(subjective time) anyway. ))

First, we would communicate and try establish with great certainty 
(lets say 99,9999%) that we really have identical identities. Then 
we would turn off our emotional instincts against termination. And 
then we would flip coins to decide which copy will be shot.

---

The reason why so many people seem to object to the termination 
of a copy (or original) of themselves is only of emotional origin. 
Humans have an instincitve emotional system build in, that objects 
against any action to end his/her existance. This system is of 
course very useful for beings in biological bodies that never 
can spawn any copies. However it is to be questioned if this 
instinctive emotional system is still that usefull when being 
an uploaded entity.

_____________________________________________________________________________


Lee Corbin wrote a small essay about duplicate identities. 

Some comments on usage of the term "me" :

I wouldnt say : "A copy of "me" is "me". However I do 
assume that our mind is an information process, and I 
consider a (partial) survival of my information process 
as (a same partial) *survival* of me. 

I include the word "partial" because in running states 
information processes can never be totally identical. Even 
when identical in a stopped state, they will diverge 
when running. But, for example a 99.99% survival, would be
quite acceptable to me.

_____________________________________________________________________________

David Pizer wrote :

>Saying the duplicate is the original, because of the memory information
>alone, and not addressing the personal nature of the meat (whose meat -
>mine or it's?)  that "feels" the memory when trying to demonstrate that all
>a person is is memory, seems to me to be begging the question.  

Please note : "Information and memory are two different things". 
Although memory is information, there are also other kinds of 
information. Information is a more general term. A stored mind 
is not only memory, it also contains other kinds of information.

>On the other hand, just as many of us are not comfortable with the 
>patterns of information only definition of selfhood, 

Being not comfortable does not constitute an objective rational 
justification to dismiss the idea that our mind is an information process.

>As far as cryonics reanimation scenarios where the brain is taken apart
>atom by atom to take measurements to make a new device that is to replace the
>original brain, that is not a way I understand that sounds like survival.

My scenario was different :

Your body is taken apart atom by atom. All the atoms 
are labeled when they are stored away. The locations 
of every atom are stored in a database. Then the body 
is build up again, atom by atom, to its original state. 
Every original atom is put in its old place. The body 
is reanimated.

So no new device is made! The old device (body) is restored! 
According to physics there should be no difference. 

(But even when different atoms would be used, there would still be 
no difference according to physics.)

When you claim that this scenario is not survival, you are in fact 
claiming that new physics is required for describing the human 
body. Of course this is always possible, although very (VERY) 
unlikely. Physical conditions in the human body do not seem to be 
very extreme.

And like Carl Sagan mentioned :

Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence.

So :

1) Do you claim that your atoms are special and not interchangeable ?

2) Do you claim that new physical forces yet unknown are required 
to explain identity or "me" ?


_____________________________________________________________________________

Thomas Donaldson wrote :

>First of all, our brains do not operate like any computer system yet
>in existence. 

Nobody claims that computer systems already exist that 
can emulate our brain correctly. 

That is a misunderstanding, the standard device envisioned 
for uploading is not a von Neumann (step-by-step processing) 
computing machine (like almost all conventional computers are), 
but very likely a very parallel computing system. Probably an 
artificial (probably electronic) neural network, i.e. an 
artificial brain. 

To prevent this kind of misunderstanding one should avoid 
explaining uploading as "transfer of the thought processes 
to a computer" but phrase it as "transfer of the thought 
processes to an artificial brain".

Indeed systems like the architecture Hugo de Garis is currently 
working with: neural networks emulated on top of cellular 
automata hardware. Maybe the conventional electronic circuits 
themselves will be replaced by quantum dot circuits in the future, 
or at least an other type of electronic circuit with nano-dimensions.

----

But at a more fundamental level, basically one could say :

In principle the "not-running" (or de-animated) state of our mind 
is only information. 
( I suppose that everybody here does agree with this ? ) 

It is then a logical induction that a "running" situation must be 
an information process.


>Connections between neurons change, at different rates,
>but even change in maturity. Most neurons that are connected are connected
>not by one synapse but by many. This alone makes them quite unlike any
>existing neural net; among other features, this changeable connectivity
>makes the simple use of wires (as in computers) not at all like how
>our brains work. In general terms, a lot of what our brains do looks
>a bit like that done by computer neural nets, but their structure
>differs a lot and therefore they will behave differently in detail.

However currently research is going on to create "exact" emulations of
the functioning of biological neurons. The meaning of the word "exact" 
in this context is : emulations capturing all aspects important for 
understanding the complete functioning of biological neurons.

(Sorry, I do not have a reference at this moment.)

In the artificial neural nets Hugo de Garis is using, the growth of 
new dendrites is also simulated...

(See http://www.hip.atr.co.jp/~degaris/ )

>Second, the hormones going through our brain affect its activity. 
>Our brain also affects the output of hormones. 

I see hormones as a kind of broadcast system. Anyway it 
does not seem to be very computationally intensive.

>It seems unlikely that we can simply say that we work 
>"like computers", even including our desires, values, aims etc. 

Because current physical knowledge implies - that the mind 
stored in a frozen brain is information - this seems to 
imply that a running mind is an information-process. 

The definition of computing system is : information-processor. 
Thus according to this definition our brain is a computing 
system. (Although it's architecture is different from any 
conventional PC.)


>If nothing else, that claim deserves far more justification than 
>it has yet received. 

IMO, all opposite claims deserve more justification. 

>It's particularly important here that feelings play a large 
>part in virtually everything we do... even the feeling of 
>curiosity is a FEELING, not something automatically generated 
>by information alone.

If the mind is an information process, feelings as part of it are 
information processes too. ( For example Marvin Minsky's agents 
model seems to fit nicely to explaining feelings. )

I dont understand why feeling cannot be an information process ???

(According to the dictionary feeling = inner perception )

>Furthermore, our brains include a great deal of unconscious parallelism.
>We aren't aware of this because our CONSCIOUSNESS only remains aware
>of issues produced by this parallelism (in combination with our feelings).

Yes.

>AT ROOT, the operation of our brain is not symbolic, among other 
>issues. Use of symbols is an operation of our brain, but it'
>s founded on non-symbolic activity.

Computing systems (even the ones based on symbolic operation) seem 
to be capable of doing none symbolic operations fine. Current PCs 
with a von Neumann architecture (i.e. step by step symbolic operation)
can recognize patterns by simulating neural nets. And, there are
also computing systems with their hardware architecture based 
directly on a neural net.

----
A footnote :

If quantum-computing occurs somewhere in the brain then this 
will complicate matters quite a bit. However it seems very unlikely 
that something like this does take place. There seems to be no scientific 
reason to assume so. On the contrary, quantum computation seems 
to require physically very isolated systems to keep their coherence 
long enough to do any useful computations.
----

>I am happy to provide references for every point I have made here
>about how our brains work. 

These points do not seem to imply that the brain is not an information 
processing system.
_____________________________________________________________________________

Rafi Haftka wrote:

>The long debate about identity appears to be a bit premature. Hundreds 
>years ago, when people did not know much about chemistry and nuclear 
>physics, many believed that they could make gold from other materials. We 
>are probably at this stage with respect to the question of whether you can 
>duplicate people, upload them into computers, or even have conscious 
>intelligent computers.

I disagree. These are not valid analogies.

We do know a lot more about the brain now, than those people hundreds of 
years ago knew about physics and chemistry. Actually they knew almost 
nothing about chemistry back then. They didnt even know about the 
building blocks of physics (all elementary particles) and chemistry 
(atomic nuclea and electrons), and im not even mentioning their poor 
knowledge of physical forces. However currently we do know what building 
blocks constitute our brain (neurons) although we do not know every small 
detail about the neurons, we do understand their basic functioning. 
Also we do know a lot about the elementary particles of physics and 
the physical forces and laws. Because physical conditions in the human 
body do not seem to be extreme, current physical theories should 
be valid (i.e. all mechanims in the human body should submit to the 
laws of physics). No new physics is required for explaining the 
functioning of our body. 

So we do know a whole lot more about the human brain than people 
hundreds of years ago new about chemistry and physics. 

Although we cannot "prove" anything yet, we can debate about 
which mechanisms are likely (and which are not) considering 
our current understanding of neurobiology and physics.

So I consider a debate not premature.
_____________________________________________________________________________

Thomas Donaldson wrote:

>In terms of the issues raised, I will say first that I'd like a bit 
>better definition of just what an "information processor" is, and
>what is "information". There is a subtlety here: any symbolic
>statement of the state of ANY machine, no matter what it does, constitutes
>information. That's clear. But is the actual state of the machine 
>an expression of information? I am saying that it is not. 

Good point! :)

I tend to agree. 

So lets assume that information is : "a symbolic statement about 
the state of a system"

But this does not imply that the human brain is not an information 
processor!!!

As I mentioned several times before, and nobody objected :

A (symbolic) description of the position and orientation (with a 
certain resolution) of every atom and/or molecule in a frozen 
brain is equal to keeping the frozen brain itself. 
(Because according to physics identical particles in the same 
state are interchangeable.)

I now explicitly ask you, do you agree with this statement ???


>Moreover, even an ordinary computer tied in with some kind of sensory
>system and some kind of action system will basically use a symbolic
>system to express the state of its perception. Doing so isn't necessary
>and may turn out to be inefficient. Sure, with lots more power than our
>brain such a system might work just as well, but a lot of that power
>is spent on doing something which brains do by not acting symbolically.

It remains to be seen if the artificial computing systems (of the 
future, for example fabricated by a mature MNT) in total (i.e. including 
all their supporting systems) are less efficient than biological ones.
I venture to say : artificial systems will be more efficient in 
processing information (i.e. running a mind) than biological ones. 
_____________________________________________________________________________

I wrote :

>However currently research is going on to create "exact" emulations of
>the functioning of biological neurons. The meaning of the word "exact" 
>in this context is : emulations capturing all aspects important for 
>understanding the complete functioning of biological neurons.
>
>(Sorry, I do not have a reference at this moment.)

I just found a nice "theoretical neurobiology" website containing 
research into neural simulation software.

See :  http://bbf-www.uia.ac.be

Abstract :

We study cerebellar function using realistic models of neurons and 
neural networks combined with electrophysiological and functional 
imaging studies in rats. We also develop neural simulation software. 
The images on our pages show voltage images of a modeled cerebellar 
Purkinje cell. 

_____________________________________________________________________________


David Pizer wrote :

>I think memories ARE ONLY information.  I do not see how they can be broken
>down into anything else??  A memory is a pattern of information imprinted
>somewhere in the brain.

I agree completely with this! But that is not what our discussion 
was about. The discussion was about : "Is the mind only information 
when in a frozen state?"

>>First you must realize that we did never claim that *the 
>>mind is only memories*.

>Perhaps, *you* didn't but I was refering to all the people who think that
>memories are the sum total of selfness, and  if they can upload their
>memories into a computer that has awareness, 

Hmm, sorry, but I do not remember anybody on this list claiming that 
*the mind is only memories*. People did claim that our mind (at least 
in a frozen state) is only information or patterns. Then you seemed 
to replace the term "information" with "memories".

My point is that you cannot *equal* information to memory. Memories 
are just one kind of information that is stored in our brain. There 
are lots of other kinds of information stored in our brain. For 
example : expectations, habits, personal character, skills, etc...


>>It seems that you are confusing a running state and frozen state 
>>of the mind. According to the informational theory of identity, 
>>the mind is only information when in a frozen state. In a running 
>>state (when the process of feeling can take place) the mind is 
>>an *information process*.

>Perhaps we are all confusing each other.  I am not saying the mind is or is
>not memories.  I am saying a person is NOT mainly memories, although they
>play a role in the make up of a person.  A person is a mind that feels
>memories.  That mind is different, separate from the memories.  The part of
>the mind that feels memories and direct sensory input and awareness is the
>part that is the main  component of selfhood.  It is a living hunk of meat;
>not an abstract pattern of information similar to what a memory is
>imprinted as.

I'm not interested in deciding which one of these two is more important 
because I dont want to loose my memories nor the part of my mind that 
feels. Furthermore this is not what our discussion is about. What I 
would like to discus is the statement : "In a frozen state our mind is 
only information."  (And that is why I said it's irrelevant. It 
is irrelevant with respect to the discussion we had.)


>>>Then it follows that memories without a mind to percieve them 
>>>in cannot exist.  
>
>>But they can. Somebody can read a book or store it away. 
>>And a story can still exist without a mind to percieve it.
>
>I am thinking of a memory in the mind that can only be felt directly.  A
>book has to be read and then would enter the mind through regular sensory
>impression channels, either through the eyes or ears.

Of course, the story/book was only an abstract analogy. At an 
abstract level, both a story and a memory are stored information, 
and reading a story or thinking about a memory are both information 
processes.


>>I would like to know, what was your answer to my hypothetical scenario? 
>>Or did you put that to rest ?
>
>I am sorry, I lost it.  Please send it again.

Hmm, Im curious what your answer will be... 

This was my hypothetical scenario :

Your body is frozen (in this hypothetical example it will 
be a perfect vitrification, so no repairs will be necessary). 

Your body is taken apart atom by atom. All the atoms 
are labeled when they are stored away. The locations 
of every atom are stored in a database. Then the body 
is build up again, atom by atom, to its original state. 
Every original atom is put in its old place. The body 
is reanimated.

Would you mind ?

(And if you would mind, could you please elaborate on 
why you would mind? )

===================

>As you know if you measure some things one way they look like a wave;  if
>you measure them another way, they look like a particle.  I don't know if
>we are having a similar difference?

No the current discussion is not similar at all.
(Do you want me to elaborate?)

_____________________________________________________________________________


David Pizer wrote :

>I might add this suggestion as to why the "memory-only-holders" are having
>so hard a time seeing this selfhood concept clearly.  Most of the
>"memory-only-holders" are mathematicians and they understand the universe
>and people through mathematical principles.
>
>But mathematics is not a good way to have direct knowledge about the
>universe and conscious beings in it.  

I always thought that there is no way to have direct knowledge 
about the universe, there are only indirect ways !!

Please, tell me how you can have direct knowledge ?


>Mathematics may or may not be a good
>way for people to have indirect knowledge and to determine *relations*
>between objects and how these relations *appear* to them (the perceivers),

That mathematics is a good way to gather (indirect) knowledge about the 
world has been proven by the tremendous success of the scientific approach 
during the last couple of centuries.

The whole idea of the scientific approach is trying to make a symbolic 
model of a physical thing and using experiments and empirical data to 
see if the model does predict the reality.

So far as we know there is *NO BETTER WAY* to gather (indirect) knowledge 
about our world. Our whole current detailed understanding of the world 
and our technological civilisation is based on the scientific method.

>I believe trying to understand consciousness in
>mathematical terms is what is giving the mathematicians their incorrect
>understanding.  If we want to really understand living consciousness and
>individualism we are going to have to do it in another way besides in
>non-living mathematics.

Hmm, what better way than the scientific approach do you suggest then ?

_____________________________________________________________________________


Maybe I should have made the subject header : "If it ain't necessary, 
don't assume new physics."  :)

I wrote :

>>This was my hypothetical scenario :
>
>>Your body is taken apart atom by atom. All the atoms 
>>are labeled when they are stored away. The locations 
>>of every atom are stored in a database. Then the body 
>>is build up again, atom by atom, to its original state. 
>>Every original atom is put in its old place. The body 
>>is reanimated.
>>Would you mind ?

David Pizer replied :

>I think I would mind.  

But I must point out to you, that according to current physical 
theories the bodies before and after disassembly are chemically 
and biologically identical...

Some people claim that some new and still unknown physical 
mechanisms will be required to explain how are our brain 
(i.e our consciousness) functions. Please note that a conscious 
state implies a running (i.e. living, animated) state.
I disagree with this, because I think that there are no good 
reasons to have to assume new physical mechanisms for explaining 
the mind (applying Occams razor). 

At least most of those people seem to agree with me regarding a 
deanimated state. They agree that in case of a *frozen* state 
*NO new physics* is required to describe our brain. 
I.e. they agree that a complete chemical description (as according 
to conventional physics) of the structure of a frozen body is 
sufficient to recreate that body.

Now you seem to go a step further! You claim that even in a 
frozen state new unknown physics is required for describing 
the body. You claim that a frozen body (at for example 0.1 
degrees Kelvin) is more than just a chemical structure of 
molecules and atoms !!!

I would like to know : "What is your scientific motivation to 
assume the necessity of some new and unknown physics ?"

What new physics and why ???

PLEASE EXPLAIN TO ME !!!! : "What kind of unknown physical 
processes are taking place in a chemical structure at 0.1 
degrees Kelvin ???

Extra-ordinary claims require extra-ordinary evidence.

>If selfhood is a unique continuing process, we now have to know if the
>re-assembled person is a continuation of the original process or a new
>process.  

Continuity in what ?

>But .. why take the person apart?  If it ain't broke, don't fix it.

Uhh, that's why it was a hypothetical scenario...

_____________________________________________________________________________


David Pizer wrote :

>Descartes proved in his First Meditations, that one can know one exists
>because in the very act of doubting one's existence, one must exist to be
>able to do the doubting.  I like to think of this as certain and direct
>knowledge. This may be the only direct knowledge one can have.  

OK, yes, I agree with this example, but this kind of direct knowledge is 
not exactly very useful knowledge.

I wrote :

>>That mathematics is a good way to gather (indirect) knowledge about the 
>>world has been proven by the tremendous success of the scientific approach 
>>during the last couple of centuries.

David replied :

>There is no success of the scientific approach in knowing anything for
>certain.  Each past scientific theory was/is doomed to be replaced or
>refined by another in the future.  
>However, the scientific approach may be a good way (probably is 
>the best present way), to predict some things with some accuracy.  

The scientific approach is the BEST way to understand ANY thing 
in an *objective* way. Do we have to know everything with 100% 
accuracy, I think that a certain limited accuracy and probability 
(depending on the situation, for example 99,999% ) is sufficient.

>The scientific approach is good for predicting and describing some things,
>it does not help us to describe what *feeling* is in any way that a person
>without feeling could understand.  If one could figure how to describe
>feeling to a being that did not have feeling, that would be, I'm pretty
>sure, a good description.

I see no problems in using the scientific approach to understand 
feelings (or any other thing) in an *objective* way.

However to feel a feeling (the subjective way) you will indeed 
need to feel it. 

Feeling a feeling is subjective, and it is indeed impossible to 
explaining things in subjective way using an objective method... :)


>To talk about mathamatical relative positions of atoms in the brain is
>gibberish in describing what consciousness or awareness *feels* like.

The "recording the positions of atoms" example was only meant as the 
first step in a line of reasoning. This hypothetical scenario was used 
to make it obvious that, in a deanimated (frozen) state we equal 
information only. 

The next example I would have given (succesively deanimating and 
animating a person) should then make it clear that in an animated 
state we are an information process.

>The scientific approach has proved nothing that can be known for sure.
>(Please don't misinterpret this to mean that I have said it is not useful,
>I have not said that.  It has not produced certain knowledge.  
>We may be getting off the track here, because certain knowledge may be
>unknowable beyond "cogito ergo sum"  

Exactly, ... we are getting off track.

>and if we can't have certain knowledge for most things then: (1) 
>present scientific predictability may be enough someday, 

I can't imagine a better tool for gaining objective understanding 
of our world.

>(2) we may develope a new language that allows us to describe
>things like "feeling" "consciousness" and "selfhood" is a more 
>accurate way.

I.e. : "A new method to objectively and rationally describe things 
in a more accurate way ..." - this again implies a better method 
than the scientific approach. And this seems unlikely at the least.
 

>So far as we know there is *NO BETTER WAY* to gather (indirect) knowledge 
>about our world. Our whole current detailed understanding of the world 
>and our technological civilisation is based on the scientific method.

>I am a materialist. I think the brain is made of mindless atoms. 

OK. 

And if you don't assume the existance of any new and unknown 
chemical processes, that take place in a body frozen at a very 
low temperature (for example at 1 degree Kelvin), then you should 
also agree that a frozen mind is only information.

>I think the mind is the brain.  But, I stand by my original 
>conclusion that we need a different way to talk about what 
>consciousness and selfhood are, other then mathamatical 
>relations, if we want to be able to describe the problems.  

A different objective method ?

I dont know any better *objective* method than the scientific 
approach...

Which method do you have in mind ?
_____________________________________________________________________________

, in his last posting David Pizer assumes that some new and 
still unknown physical mechanisms are required to explain how 
the brain can generate consciousness :

>1.	The parts of a conscious process produce different *effects,*  then they
>do outside it.  This is axiomatic.  So there are some laws that describe
>the effects of matter in general and different, extended and more complete,
>laws (not yet understood) that would describe the effects of matter in a
>conscious process. 

<snip>

>Their problem, in a nutshell, is that the non-Pizerists use rules for
>describing non-physical things to describe physical things.

Uhh ? Can you give some concrete examples ?

Or are you referring to the scientific approach ?


>No one doubts that the person stepping out will have a personal existence,
>and most will not doubt that the person stepping out will "think" he/she is
>the other person, but the question is not what the person stepping out
>thinks, but rather what is the truth about the survival of the person
>stepping in? (Why we also need better epistemology).

Already the existance of this apparent "paradox" seems to imply that 
the informational viewpoint of identity is the correct one. Because 
using this last viewpoint there is no "paradox" ! 

When having two theories, and one of them having internal 
inconsistencies (i.e. paradoxes), not mention that it also 
requires the assumption of new and unknown physics theories 
whilst having no direct fundamental physics experiments(1) that 
seem to motivate such an assumption, while on the other hand 
the other theory has none of these, then it is rational to choose 
the second theory and dispose of the more complex and incomplete one.

( (1): experiments suggesting the requirement of new physics theories 
for explaining mechanisms inside the human brain )


<snip>

>be a difference between the two persons and that difference is what makes
>the two persons not the same person.  You do not have the same unique
>process feeling the identical memories in the two examples; so, you can not
>know that the two are the same person.

Of course two different persons are not the same person.
Using the "term" person here, only confuses everthing. I 
suggest not to compare "persons" but only *identities*.

I do claim that two frozen bodies with the exact identical 
chemical structure contain the same identity. When the bodies 
would be animated then of course, they would immidiately start 
to diverge. But of course, we "non-Pizerists" already mentioned 
this many, many times over.

_____________________________________________________________________________


Thomas Donaldson argues that realtime simulation of the inter-
connections of biological neurons is a serious problem for 
Turing machines. He seems to suggest that the problem arises 
because all possible connections between all neurons 
should be taken into account. And this number increases 
enormously (like (n-1)! ). However it appears that the major 
part of all interconnections between neurons in the brain are 
relatively local. This quite diminishes the connective complexity 
required. 

I also must mention again that it is fairly unlikely that the 
hardware architecture for uploading a human mind will be like 
a Turing machine.

Furthermore he argues that current digital neural nets are 
only partial models. I agree with that. But does he dare to 
claim that we will not succeed in creating a sufficient model 
within a hundred years, or a thousand years, or ever ?

The question should be : "Will the dynamics of the interconnections 
be implemented in hardware or software ?" 

There is always the option to represent every change in the connections 
by a real change in the hardware architecture, using this method there 
shouldn't be any more problems than in biological hardware.

But because the major part of interconnections in our brain is 
relatively local it's likely that there are no insurmountable 
problems with implementing the connection changes in software, 
and not in hardware, because the hardware option will be less 
energy efficient (and also slower).

_____________________________________________________________________________

Pat Clancy wrote :

>The AI proponents have been claiming for decades that they'll soon achieve a 
>breakthrough, and it never happens. IMHO it never will happen, the Turing 

A couple of decades ago they still assumed that AI could best be 
developed using a heuristics approach. At the moment the connectionist 
approach (i.e. neural nets) looks more promising. Also the computing 
and storage capacity was never enough. 

Furthermore what happened in the past can never be used as an 
argument for what will happen in the future. Somebody in the 
1955 could just as well have said : "Space travel proponents 
have been claiming for decades that man will go to space, and 
it never happens."

>We will never have HAL running on a computer, not even by 20,001.

So you claim it will take more than 18,000 years to develop human 
(or more) equivalent AIs...   Hmm,...  (sigh)

>I hope that some other form of substrate can be developed that can support 
>an artificial mind. But this will depend on our achieving some degree of 
>understanding of how the mind works. Currently we have _no idea_ how the 
>mind works. 

We do not have to know how the mind works to be able to develop 
an artificial substrate. We only have to know how it's building 
blocks function (i.e. the neurons). See my other postings.
(Of course, this is a simplified statement...)

>To go back to computers, but only as an analogy: it's as if you 
>were given a computer, and you could observe it and run programs, 
<snip>
>certainly couldn't infer anything about even the lowest level 
>virtual machine with your voltmeter. 

If you could use a microscope and a voltmeter, and if you 
would have multiple computers that you could take apart and 
analyse piece by piece, then somebody could certainly infer 
everything, especially at the lowest levels. (Assuming that 
that somebody would have a certain level of understanding of 
physics.) You could start for example by analysing the 
circuits on the CPU, and find out that the transistors 
form logic circuits ... etc.

_____________________________________________________________________________


I seem to have to repeat myself over and over... <sigh>

Dear David, you are still mixing up the terms "person" and "identity" 
and also the terms "information" and "memory". They are not 
interchangable!! And I do think that all non-Pizerists agree with 
this. I already did mention this several times in my earlier postings.

A lot of our arguments are about the differences between these 
terms, please try to prevent making these mistakes over and over 
again. It is very important in a discussion, to be using the 
same definitions of terms.

I wrote :

>>Again, in his last posting David Pizer assumes that some new and 
>>still unknown physical mechanisms are required to explain how 
>>the brain can generate consciousness :

David replied :

>I think almost anyone studying brains would agree that new science is
>needed to explain consciousness.  

But not new physics!! I was referring to new physics.

=====

>The difference is that they look at a person as an abstract, 
>non-physical relation of positions of objects, like neurons, 
>or molecules or atoms.  

I do too. 

>Since no two of these feeling devices can occupy the same space 
>at the same time, no two physical feeling processes can be the same.

But I agree that no two *processes* can be the same.

(And I think I do speak for all non-Pizerists.)

>I do not see the paradox.  What am I missing?

OK, in your case there is no paradox, because you're assuming *new 
physics*. And using the informational approach there is definitely 
no paradox. But why do they call it the "copy-paradox" then ?


>Pizer theory holds that no two separate, physical "feeling processes" can
>occupy the same space at the same time.  

I think all non-Pizerists will agree with this.

>Of course, that only shows one of the reasons why the non-Pizerists 
>are wrong, 

No, it doesnt, because we agree with that statement. :)

>>Of course two different persons are not the same person.
>>Using the "term" person here, only confuses everthing. I 
>>suggest not to compare "persons" but only *identities*.

>We, in cryonics, want to survive as people.  We are talking about the
>survival of a person, not the survival of identities.  My main purpose as a
>cryonicist is for, David Pizer, the person to survive, not an identity of

With "identity" I mean : the information describing a mind frozen 
in time. With "person" I mean : the mind when it is in a running state 
(i.e. an information process according to non-Pizerists).

And of course, also we non-Pizerists want to survive as a person too!
Because only surviving in a static state is not living. I.e. when 
cryo-suspended, I do not want to stay frozen, the goal is to be 
re-animated again.

And I'm quite sure Jeffrey Soreff wants this too, although he did 
say : "but am quite satisfied by survival of my identity." Many non-
Pizerists also make the mistake of mixing up the terms identity and 
person! (And the terms memory and information.)

>Your point above is interesting.  Perhaps *all* non-Pizerists are not
>claiming that two identical persons are one and the same.  However, *some*
>have claimed this and that claim is what I am doubting.  

Maybe those persons are only a small minority of the non-Pizerists.


>If an idenity was copied and *put* into a second person, who also 
>felt the identity as did the original person, then we are no longer 
>talking about 2 idenities, but 2 persons.  

Again, I think that most non-Pizerists do agree with this statement.


>That is where I think the differences arise.  That is where I
>think there are now two persons, each feeling the same identities, 
>but each now wanting to survive.  

We agree again.

>I don't know what all the non-Pizerists think about this point.  
>Perhaps we are not all so far apart.

The question should be "What do we consider survival ?".

Of course, this is largely a personal opinion based on emotions.
I consider the existance of a person with a very large part of 
my identity (more than 95% of all aspects of my identity, 
so NOT ONLY my memories) sufficient for my survival. David Pizer 
seems to have the requirement that his chemical structure must 
have no discontinuities in time.

>To repeat with different words:  Two abstract descriptions, neither one
>installed in bodies, may be the one same person, but when they are both
>installed into 2 separate persons, the 2 persons are not the same because
>each person *feels* the memories in 2 different awareness processes, it two
>different places in space at the same time.

>Or, some have argued that measuring the original, storing the information,
>destroying the original and then installing the information in a new person
>is a survival of the old person.  

I have claimed something like this. But I did not formulate it exactly 
like this.

----------

>What if there was another person in another universise living a life just
>like your's and thinking exactly what you are thinking from your day one to
>now.  What if you were to be destroyed now and you know that other person
>in that other universe is not going to be destroyed.  Would you still mind
>being destroyed?

This is contradictionary, if the person in the other universe was 
living a life just like the other, he would be destroyed too. :)

Seriously, I think this is not a good question. But if I would know 
for sure that a copy of me would survive (a very recent copy) and 
if I would have total control over my emotions (i.e. being 
able to turn off my physical survival instinct), then I wouldnt 
mind being destroyed in this scenario.

_____________________________________________________________________________


Pat Clancy wrote :

>In fact there are activities of the mind that would seem 
>strongly not to be describle by any sort of finite, deterministic computation 
>(which is the only kind you get from a computer). The detailed arguments, 
>much better than I could present, can be found in various books ("What 
>Computers Can't Do", Dreyfus; "Emporer's New Mind", "Shadows of the 
>Mind", Penrose; "The Undiscovered Mind", Horgan; more on request).

I was going to mention some books that argue the other way, (from : 
Hofstadter, Dennet, Minsky, Kurzweil, Moravec, etc.) but Lee Corbin 
already did so...

>One of the arguments against the AI proponents is precisely that computer 
>programs still are unable to simulate the most simple/primitive of animal 
>activities - 

On the contrary, simple primitive animal activities (functions) can 
already be simulated.

I can remember simulated organisms with simulated 
neural nets that where genetically evolved using certain 
survival rules. These virtual organisms developped movements 
and also behaviors (competition strategies) you also see in 
real biological organisms.

(After some searching I found the website !!!! See :
 http://www.biota.org/ksims/blockies/index.html  )

Many of the activities of the neural nets in the human eye 
have been reproduced in artificial neural nets.

Of course only simple functions can be reproduced yet, because 
the current artificial neural nets are still limited in size.

I could do a survey for more examples...

>Well, my feeling is that it doesn't matter how many millions of years of 
>development take place, or what state of the brain is being simulated - 
>it just won't happen with a Turing machine.

To avoid any miscommunication : Do you consider 3D cellular automata 
(CA) based neural nets (containing millions or billions of artificial 
neurons) which grow and evolve inside cellular automata machines (CAMs) 
(in based FPGA field programmable gate arrays, hardware) a Turing 
machine ?

When I used the term "Turing Machines" I was always reffering 
to step by step symbolic computing systems with only a low 
number of processors. I was not refferring to massively 
parallel systems, like hardware implemented neural nets, 
although in principle they also should be considered Turing 
machines.
_____________________________________________________________________________


Thomas Donaldson wrote:

>1. No one yet has produced a proof that a real-time computer with the
>   features of brains would actually be imitatable by a Turing machine.

If that real time computer is a discrete system the proof that it 
can be imitated by a Turing machine has been made.

>2. Just like primitive creatures, the basis of our brains' working 
>   depends not on math or logic but on the special features of our 
>   neurons as "machines". This is not just a statement about hardware,
>   but a statement of how our thinking works. The calculations of a
>   computer depend not on themselves but on the meaning human beings

It is sufficient that the internal symbolic representations are 
consistent. Then if it is an autonomous system, it does not matter 
what meaning humans attach to them.

>   attach to them. Our own thinking depends on those basic processes,
>   which generate (sometimes) patterns which look like logic and math.

Pattern recognition can be done by symbolic discrete systems, 
so why not the other way around.

>3. Unfortunately to someone familiar with the physiology of brain cells,
>   the models so far used lack essential features of the device which
>   is our brain. These include those I have discussed already: the
>   ability to grow new neurons and constantly change the connections 
>   of existing ones... 

I have given some references.

>   plus the very simple feature that we must work
>   in real time. 

Just a question of time, needed by the development of technology 
to create faster hardware.

>   I am not at all against the USE of such models, so
>   long as we do not confuse them with complete versions of how our
>   brain or any part of it actually works in detail.

The question is, of course, which details are essential for the 
functioning of the mind? Do we need to include details at the 
quantum mechanical level. I think not! And it seems that most 
neuro-scientists do neither.

>So come on, guys. I have asked a very simple question: has anyone got
>a proof that human brains can be imitated (even if only abstractly)
>by a Turing machine. 

Of course not! (Not yet.)
Neither is there any proof of the opposite claim.

However it does seem more likely that our brains can be functionally 
imitated by a discrete system than not.

>And I am emphatically NOT allowing partial imitations
>of some part of our brain, but only the whole brain. 

Why do you think that the neurons in some parts of the brain 
work differently at a *fundamental* level ?  Do you have any 
proof for this claim ?  :)


>Everyone who believes in the possibility of such imitations seems 
>to assume their possibility, without any attempt to show it. 

From a scientific point of view it seems more likely.
No, there  is no proof yet, but neither is there for the 
opposite claim. If there already was proof, then we wouldn't 
have this discussion.

>Everyone who refuses to believe in their possibility has various 
>features which may (or may not) make such imitations impossible. 

Those various features are either irrelevant or without proof.
____________________________________________________________________________


Pat Clancy wrote :

>But physical/quantum reality happens at infinite 
>precision, and the infinite precision "calculations" of reality happen instantly - 

<snip>

>you cannot just calculate the positions and momenta of particles as they 

<snip>

>would not run in real time, i.e. that you could in theory simulate sequentially 
>those things that were instantaneous in reality, 

<snip>

Of course, a discrete system cannot imitate an analog system (or 
a quantum mechanical system) with exact precision. However the 
question is : "Is exact accuracy required?" 

First of all, it doesn't seem likely that details at the 
quantum mechanical are essential for the functioning of 
the mind. (And that's what is the issue here.)
And it seems that most neuro-scientists tend to agree. 

If you think so, can you give me the scientific motivation 
as to why ?

(By the way, even an analog system cannot imitate an other 
analog system exactly in practice! Because therefore you 
would need to measure it with exact precision, which is 
fundamentally impossible according to physics.)

====

However exact precision is not required...

Any analog system is in practice being perturbed all the time. 
Indeed a single fluctuation in some quantum state(s) can determine 
the direction/result of our thought processes. But you don't even 
need quantum mechanics for that, a single particle or photon of 
background radiation could also do that. Or the fluctuation of 
thermal energy of a single particle in your mind. However our 
thought processes do not seem to be very chaotic... 

The question is : "What is essential for the functioning of the mind?"

====

Lets make this clear by an example :

A computer is also a system made of particles governed by quantum 
mechanics. Continuously there are changes and fluctuations in the 
quantum states of those particles. Are the exact states important 
for the functioning of the of the computer? ..NO  What is important 
for the functioning however, is the statistical behavior of larger 
numbers of particles due to their quantum mechanical states. 
Otherwise, for example, a transistor circuit wouldn't work. 
Analogously, the exact thermal states of the particles are not 
relevant. However the average thermal states of larger systems 
of particles is. The high level logic functioning of a computer 
does not depend on the exact states of the single particles.
But still a single particle or thermal fluctuation could determine 
the outcome of a calculation in that computer. (And that last one, 
is more likely to happen when your computer gets hotter.)

I assume you agree with all this?  (... for a computer)

====

So, because the functioning of our mind does not seem to display 
a chaotic behavior (for most people :> ) it seems that it's 
functioning is based on mechanisms that operate at a higher 
level, and that the fluctuations in the lower level mechanisms 
are statistically evened out.

Also randomly destroying a certain amount of single neurons does 
not seem to disturb the functioning of our mind. The same 
appears to be true for artificial neural networks.

This all seems to imply that we do not need to make 
an imitation with infinite precision, to imitate 
the functioning of the mind.

** With "functioning of the mind" I mean : "High level 
functions, like intelligent behavior, feelings, 
selfconsciousness."

_____________________________________________________________________________


I wrote :

>However exact precision is not required...
>Any analog system is in practice being perturbed all the time. 
...

I forgot to mention, if an emulation (or imitation) of my 
brain would behave about 99.999% identical, then I would 
already be satisfied to upload to that emulation (assuming it 
would have advantages, like running faster, more efficient, 
being more adaptable, etc...)

_____________________________________________________________________________